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Abstract 
Previous work has shown that self-generating arguments is more persuasive than reading 
arguments provided by others, particularly if self-generation feels easy. The present study 
replicates and extends these findings by providing evidence for fluency effects on 
behavioural intention in the realm of helping. In two studies, participants were instructed to 
either self-generate or read two versus ten arguments about why it is good to help. 
Subsequently, a confederate asked them for help. Results show that self-generating few 
arguments is more effective than generating many arguments. While this pattern reverses for 
reading arguments, easy self-generation is the most effective strategy compared to all other 
conditions. These results have important implications for fostering behavioural change in all 
areas of life.  
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Helping made easy: Ease of Argument Generation Enhances Intentions to Help 
To persuade others to do something, it is considered common to provide arguments (Crano & 
Prislin, 2006; Wood, 2000), yet often this strategy does not notably increase compliance (e.g., 
Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). A more successful strategy to elicit certain behaviours is to ask 
others to self-generate arguments, a technique called self-persuasion (e.g., Greenwald & 
Albert, 1968; Janis & King, 1954; King & Janis, 1956; for an overview see Aronson, 1999), 
which has proven to successfully influence both attitudes and behaviour (e.g., Briñol, 
McCaslin, & Petty, 2012; Müller et al., 2009; Müller et al., 2016). Several reasons are 
discussed in the literature on why self-persuasion is particularly effective. Firstly, Bem’s 
(1967, 1972) perspective on attitude formation holds that individuals construct their attitudes 
by observing their own behaviour. As a result, someone who finds him- or herself 
formulating arguments about why it is good to act in a particular way may conclude that this 
is his or her own stance. Secondly, when arguments are provided, individuals are likely to 
notice that others are trying to persuade them. Such persuasion attempts may be experienced 
as a threat to their freedom to choose. As a consequence, individuals may engage in self-
guarding strategies, including reactance to the suggested behaviour (Brehm, 1966; Crawford, 
McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman, 2002). Such self-guarding strategies are much less likely to 
occur when arguments have not been provided, but when arguments are self-generated 
(Brehm, 1966; Loman, Müller, Oude Groote Beverborg, van Baaren, & Buijzen, 2016). 
Thirdly, while people are able to detect an external source of influence, and have the 
tendency to correct for information provided by this external source, it is much more difficult 
for them to detect an internal source of influence (e.g., Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000). 
Fourthly, when individuals generate arguments, they tend to come up with arguments that 
they find the most compelling (Greenwald & Albert, 1968). 
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 When relying on self-persuasion, one could argue that one can never have too much 
of a good thing, so that the more arguments individuals generate, the better. However, 
Wänke, Bless, and Biller (1996) observed that participants who generated three arguments 
favouring or opposing a certain topic changed their attitudes more in line with these 
arguments than those who generated seven arguments. These findings extended earlier work 
of Schwarz, Bless, Strack, and colleagues (1991) in the realm of self-perception. These 
authors observed that participants who recalled few prior instances of assertive behaviour 
(which is easy) judged their assertiveness as higher than participants who recalled many 
instances (which is difficult). Presumably, the participants relied on the perceived ease or 
difficulty of recall, inferring, for instance, the following: if recalling instances feels easy, 
there are many, suggesting that I am rather assertive; in contrast, if recalling feels difficult, 
there are only few such instances, suggesting that I am not very assertive. Since its 
publication, the few-versus-many paradigm introduced by Schwarz, Bless, Strack, and 
colleagues has been relied on numerously, and the ease-of-retrieval pattern has proven to be a 
reliable effect of medium size (for meta-analytic evidence, see Weingarten & Hutchinson, 
2016; for conceptual reviews, see Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz, 2004; Wänke, 
2013). 
 That the experience of ease or difficulty may constitute a valuable source of 
information was first demonstrated in the context of frequency and probability judgments 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Subsequently, ease-of-retrieval effects were observed in 
the realms of (self-)attitudinal judgments (e.g., Schwarz, Bless, Strack, et al., 1991; Wänke, 
Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997; Weick & Guinote, 2008) and self-persuasion (e.g., Clarkson, 
Tormala, & Leone, 2011; Wänke et al., 1996). Recently, it has been further suggested that 
ease-of-retrieval may inform behavioural intentions (Menon & Raghubir, 2003) and even 
guide behaviour (Greifeneder, Müller, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2011b; Müller, 
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Greifeneder, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2010; Stone & Fernandez, 2011). For 
instance, Greifeneder and colleagues (2011b) asked participants to name few or many reasons 
for why a specific procedure is unfair, and observed that the ease or difficulty associated with 
naming these reasons guided trustful behaviour.  
 Interestingly, none of these behavioural studies focused on the generation of reasons 
to perform a specific behaviour, which is the signature of self-persuasion. This is surprising 
for at least two reasons. First, behaviour change is a topic of utmost importance across 
various domains of psychology and beyond, including, for instance, health behaviour or 
sustainability. Given that (easy) self-generation has proven fruitful with respect to attitudes 
(e.g., Aronson, 1999), these domains may strongly benefit from knowing whether (easy) self-
generation may be effective on the behavioural level, too. Second, a large literature suggests 
that attitudes do not necessarily translate into behaviour (“attitude-behaviour gap”; e.g., 
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Bohner & Schwarz, 2001; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio & Towles-
Schwen, 1999; Holland, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 2002). The powerful effects of 
(easy) self-generation on attitudes thus need not be mimicked on the behavioural level, and 
research focusing on the effect of (easy) self-generation on behaviour is needed. Note that we 
conclude from the attitude-behaviour gap that attitudes do not equal behaviour; it is not 
implied that the effect of self-generation on behaviour needs to be mediated via attitudes, as 
will be further discussed in the General Discussion.  
 Against this background, the present contribution constitutes an extended replication 
of the evidence reported by Wänke and colleagues (1996). In addition to replicating, the 
present contribution shifts the focus from attitudes to behaviours, collects data in the field, 
and assesses non-factorial control groups. Note that we measure, strictly speaking, 
behavioural intent and not behaviour per se, because the experiment was stopped once 
participants consented to perform the behaviour. Conclusions about behaviour appear 
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nevertheless possible, because this measure of intent comes very close to actual behaviour, 
and because intent has been shown to be a good (Webb & Sheeran, 2006) or even the most 
important precursor of behaviour (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). 
 With these goals in mind, in Studies 1 and 2, students in the students-restaurant of the 
University TOWN/COUNTRY were asked to persuade themselves by generating two, ten, or 
no arguments (control) for why it is good to help others. To measure helping, students were 
subsequently asked to provide feedback on an essay by a confederate posing as another 
student. The dependent variable was whether participants consented to this request. In Study 
2, participants in two extra conditions were asked to read either two or ten arguments for why 
it is good to help, before being approached by a confederate who asked for help. Note that the 
arguments provided in the reading conditions were the best arguments generated in Study 1, 
thus constituting a particularly conservative benchmark. For Studies 1 and 2, we predict that 
generating two compared to ten arguments for why it is good to help will result in stronger 
helping intentions. This pattern is hypothesised to reverse in Study 2 when participants do not 
generate but are provided with arguments: here, ten arguments should lead to stronger 
helping intentions than two arguments. 
Study 1 
Method 
 Participants and design. Sixty participants (41 females, Mage=21.9 years, SD=2.27) 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (ten arguments vs. two arguments vs. 
control).  
 Materials and procedure. The experiment took place in the student-restaurant of 
University TOWN during off-peak hours. In all three conditions, the experiment started with 
the female confederate taking a seat close to a person sitting alone at a table. In order to avoid 
selection bias, all persons sitting alone were approached. One minute later, the experimenter 
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approached both, and asked for participation in a short experiment. If the participant agreed, 
the confederate also consented, after which the experimenter gave them pen and paper and 
asked them to write down arguments for “why it is good to help.” To ensure that the 
confederate was blind to condition, the experimenter did not mention the number of 
arguments verbally. After returning the arguments, the participant and confederate completed 
a short questionnaire that gathered their age, gender, whether they were currently a student, 
whether they currently engaged in paid work or volunteering, and their opinion about 
debating. The experimenter then thanked them for participating, and left. 
 After half a minute, the confederate approached the participant with the target request 
(Burger, Soroka, Gonzago, Murphy, & Somervell, 2001). The confederate mentioned to 
attend a writing course, that participants of this course were required to write an eight-page 
essay, and that she had to ask someone unknown to provide feedback on this essay. The 
confederate presented the essay to the participant and asked whether he or she would be 
willing to deliver this feedback. In the control condition, the confederate only made the target 
request to the participant after sitting closely for approximately one minute. In all conditions, 
the participant’s response to the request (“yes” or “no”) was the dependent variable. 
Subsequently, the participant was told that the feedback did not actually have to be given. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
 In the two arguments condition, 20 participants (91%) generated two arguments, one 
participant (4.5%) generated four arguments, and one participant (4.5%) five arguments. In 
the ten arguments condition, 14 participants (78%) generated ten arguments, two participants 
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(11%) generated nine arguments, and two participants (11%) generated six arguments. In 
both conditions, no counterarguments were written up.1 
 Chi-square analyses indicated that participants in the two arguments condition agreed 
to provide feedback more often (86.4%) than participants in the ten arguments condition 
(44.4%), χ²1 = 7.93, p = .005, φc = .45, and participants in the control condition (45.0%), χ²1 = 
8.07, p = .005, φc = .44. The number of participants who agreed to provide feedback did not 
differ significantly between the ten arguments condition and the control condition, χ²1 = 
0.001, p = .97 (Figure 1).  
 Quality. After study completion, six independent judges were asked to rate each of 
the arguments that were generated on argument quality using a seven-point scale (1 = very 
bad argument; 7 = very good argument; ICC = .27, 95% CI [.11, .41]). A MANOVA with 
condition and position of the argument as factors revealed that the quality of the arguments in 
the two-arguments condition was not rated as significantly higher (M=4.77, SD=0.52) than 
those in the ten arguments condition (M=4.43, SD=0.63), F(1,200) = 2.96, p = .09. 
Discussion 
 These results replicate and extend earlier research (e.g., Wänke et al., 1996) by 
showing that the impact of easy self-generation is not confined to the attitudinal level, but 
extends to behavioural intentions. To the extent that behavioural change is desired, self-
persuasion that feels easy therefore appears as an effective means.   
 Three potential alternative explanations deserve short discussion. First, one might 
argue that participants who had to generate ten arguments had a stronger feeling of having 
helped the experimenter than participants who generated two arguments, which then led to 
less helping when the confederate made the target request. That would mean that not ease-of-
retrieval is responsible for the differences in the two conditions, but the size of the first 
                                                
1 Pattern and significance levels remain the same when excluding the participants who did not exactly follow 
instructions. 
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request and the feeling of already having done enough after generating ten arguments. 
However, the foot-in-the-door literature suggests that a successful bigger first request leads, 
if anything, to higher compliance with the second target request (e.g., Fish & Kaplan, 1974; 
Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Seligman, Bush, & Kirsch, 1976), based on a more mindless state 
during the second request (Fennis & Janssen, 2010). This is true irrespective of whether the 
initial and target requests are rather similar (Fennis & Jansen, 2010; Seligman et al., 1976) or 
different (Fish & Kaplan, 1974; Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Considerations of “having helped 
enough already” in the ten arguments condition are therefore unlikely to constitute a valid 
alternative explanation of the present findings.  
 Second, assuming that participants had other plans after their stay in the cafeteria, one 
could argue that those having generated ten compared to two arguments were more likely to 
be short of time when approached with the second request.  
 Third, by trend the average argument content quality was higher in the few compared 
to the many condition. Although this difference did not reach conventional levels of 
significance, it may deserve attention since we effectively tested the null-hypothesis of no 
difference. On the conceptual level, differences in content quality are interesting because they 
constitute an alternative explanation to experiences of ease of difficulty as the underlying 
mechanism (see Wänke, 2013, for an extended discussion). To be psychologically 
meaningful, however, such quality differences need to reflect participants’ own perspective, 
and not the judgments of external raters. This is because participants’ quality ratings likely 
differ from those of raters who know about all arguments across participants, whereas 
participants only know their own. To test the content quality alternative explanation, self-
ratings are necessary, which we collected in Study 2.   
Study 2 
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 Study 2 is to replicate and extend Study 1 by using a variant of the writer-reader 
paradigm introduced by Wänke and colleagues (1996). These authors asked some 
participants to generate arguments, and then provided these same arguments to other 
participants. By means of such a yoked design, the authors effectively ruled out differences in 
content quality as an alternative explanation for the few-versus-many paradigm (for an 
extended discussion, see Wänke, 2013; for further supporting evidence, e.g., Greifeneder, 
Müller, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2011a; Ruder & Bless, 2003; Tsai & McGill, 
2011). Instead of yoking participants, we selected the best ten arguments from Study 1 and 
presented either two or ten of these to some participants in Study 2. By doing so, we wished 
to directly compare the potency of self-generation versus argument provision. In particular, 
whereas Study 1 allows comparing the effectiveness of easy self-generation to a control 
group, it is silent with respect to other persuasion techniques. By providing arguments in 
Study 2 we can gauge the effectiveness of easy self-persuasion with respect to a persuasion 
technique that is particularly common (e.g., Crano & Prislin, 2006). We selected the best 
arguments from Study 1 to set an especially conservative benchmark for this test. Method 
 Participants and design. One-hundred-and-fifty participants (90 females, Mage=22.3 
years, SD=3.29) were randomly assigned to a 2 (Argument Number: two vs. ten) x 2 
(Argument Type: self-generated vs. provided) between-subjects design, with an additional 
non-factorial control group.  
 Materials and procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was identical to Study 1, except 
for four changes: first, participants were either asked to self-generate arguments, or they were 
provided with arguments. The provided arguments were selected from Study 1 based on the 
external raters’ quality judgments. In particular, the ten/two arguments that received the 
highest average rating were selected (Mten = 5.78, SDten = 0.11; Mtwo = 5.92, SDtwo = 0.12).  
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 Second, as an added precaution to ensure confederate blindness, the confederate was 
seated in such a way that she was not looking at the participant directly. Third, as an 
additional manipulation check, the experimenter surreptitiously measured how much time 
participants in the generation conditions took to produce the arguments (generation 
latencies). Fourth, before being debriefed, participants in the generation conditions were 
asked to rate the quality of each of their arguments on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 
bad to good; additionally, they were asked to rate how difficult it was to generate the 
arguments on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from very difficult to very easy. 
Results 
 In the two arguments condition, 30 participants (100%) generated two arguments. In 
the ten arguments condition, 22 participants (73.3%) generated ten arguments, one participant 
(3.3%) generated 12 arguments, one participant (3.3%) generated 11 arguments, two 
participants (6.7%) generated eight arguments, two participants (6.7%) generated seven 
arguments, and one participant (3.3%) generated three arguments. Furthermore, one 
participant (3.3%) generated nine arguments why it is good to help, and three counter 
arguments why it is not good to help. In the two arguments condition, no counterarguments 
were written up.2 
 Helping intention. A logistic regression was performed to test whether participants 
were more likely to help (the dependent variable) as a result of the type of assignment as 
predictor (self-generated or provided), the number of arguments as predictor (two or ten), and 
the interaction between the two. Type of assignment (self-generated or provided) 
significantly predicted helping (OR = 21.00; SE = .73; p < .05), as well as the number of 
arguments (OR = 3.50; SE = .55; p < .05). Importantly, both main effects were qualified by 
the predicted significant interaction (OR = 0.02; SE = .90; p < .05; see Figure 2). Participants 
                                                
2 Pattern and significance levels remain the same when excluding the participants who did not exactly follow 
instructions. 
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who self-generated two arguments agreed to provide feedback more often than participants 
who self-generated ten arguments (OR = 9.00; SE = .61; p < .05). This pattern reversed when 
participants were provided with arguments: participants who were provided with ten 
arguments agreed to provide feedback more often than participants who were provided with 
two arguments (OR = 3.50; SE = .55; p < .05).  
 Of interest, chi-square analyses showed that participants who self-generated two 
arguments agreed to provide feedback more often (90.0%) than participants in the control 
condition (36.7%), χ²1 = 18.37, p < .001, φc = .55; the number of participants who agreed to 
provide feedback did not differ significantly between those who generated ten arguments 
(33.3%) and those in the control condition, χ²1 = 0.07, p = .79. The number of participants 
who agreed to provide feedback did not differ significantly between those who were provided 
with ten arguments (60.0%) and those in the control condition, although the results show a 
trend towards the former being more effective, χ²1 = 3.27, p = .07, nor was there a difference 
between those who were provided with two arguments (30.0%) and the control condition, χ²1 
= 0.30, p = .58.  
 Generation latency. Participants who self-generated two arguments required 
significantly less time (M=111.50 s, SD=118.12) than participants who self-generated ten 
arguments (M=355.77 s, SD=117.96), F(1,58) = 64.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. 
 Ease/difficulty. Participants who self-generated two arguments found generating the 
arguments significantly easier (M=3.67, SD=0.92) than participants who self-generated ten 
arguments (M=2.50, SD=0.90), F(1,58) = 24.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. Generation latency and 
perceived ease/difficulty were significantly negatively correlated, r(60) = -.60, p < .01, 
reflecting that the less time participants took to self-generate the arguments, the easier they 
perceived the task. A logistic regression with perceived ease/difficulty as predictor and 
helping as dependent variable revealed a significant effect, OR = 2.08, SE = .28; p < .05. 
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However, mediation analyses using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012) with number of arguments as 
predictor, ease/difficulty as mediator, and helping as dependent variable suggest that 
perceived ease/difficulty does not mediate the effect of the number of arguments on helping, 
indirect effect -0.15 bootstrapped 95% CI [-1.13, 1.10] based on 5000 bootstrap replications. 
 Quality. Participants who self-generated two arguments did not rate the quality of 
their arguments as significantly higher (M=3.57, SD=0.80) than those who self-generated ten 
arguments (M=3.50, SD=0.49), F(1,58) = 0.17, p = .68. These results suggest that differences 
in content quality are unlikely to account for the observed behavioural data (see also Wänke, 
2013).  
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicates findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that more participants in the 
few compared to many self-generated arguments condition intended to help. In addition, 
Study 2 used a variant of the writer-reader design introduced by Wänke and colleagues 
(1996). While Wänke and colleagues yoked every participant in the generation condition with 
one participant in the provision condition reader, we selected the best arguments from Study 
1 and provided these to the readers in Study 2, with the goal to compare the common 
persuasion technique of providing arguments with self-generation. Replicating earlier 
evidence (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), provided arguments resulted in a more-is-better 
pattern, that is: reading ten compared to two arguments for helping led to more participants 
who intended to help. However, reading ten arguments was still less effective than self-
generating two arguments. This appears particularly noteworthy because by providing the 
best arguments in the reading conditions, we have chosen a conservative benchmark. From 
our perspective, these results powerfully attest to the strength and potential of easy self-
generation to evoke behavioural change. We hasten to add, however, that these findings are 
contingent upon the specific arguments provided by our participants in Studies 1 and 2, and 
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may therefore no not allow for generalised conclusions about the relative strength of fluency 
versus content quality. Nevertheless, the observed difference in effectiveness between 
argument provision and self-generation appears impressive.  
 Interestingly, reading any number of arguments (two or ten) was not more persuasive 
than having no arguments at all (control condition). One could speculate that being provided 
with arguments is simply not very effective; after all, in previous research on the strength of 
provided arguments, mostly marginal effects were reported (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011; King 
& Janis, 1956; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Weick & Guinote, 2008). Another explanation could 
be that individuals in these conditions produced self-guarding strategies such as reactance, 
which can occur when people recognise a persuasion attempt (Brehm, 1966; Crawford et al., 
2002). Furthermore, participants might have generated counterarguments against the 
provided arguments (Tormala, Falces, Briñol, & Petty, 2007). 
 It should be noted that perceived ease/difficulty predicted helping intention, yet did 
not prove as a significant mediator of the link between the number of arguments and helping. 
This may be surprising, but is consistent with recent meta-analytic evidence provided by 
Weingarten and Hutchinson (2016) who observed a medium-sized effect of the few-versus-
many manipulation on the dependent variable, of which, however, only half was mediated by 
perceived ease of retrieval. The authors discuss various explanations and call for future 
research on the inferential mechanisms underlying the ease-of-retrieval effect.  
General Discussion 
 Research has shown that self-generation is a particularly powerful path to attitude 
change (Aronson, 1999), especially when self-generation feels easy (Wänke et al., 1996). The 
present studies successfully replicate these findings. While the few-versus-many ease-of-
retrieval paradigm has been relied on numerously in the literature (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 
2011a; Schwarz, 2004; Wänke, 2013; Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2016), field settings such as 
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the present one are rare. Moreover, few studies have assessed non-factorial control groups, 
presumably because these harbour a methodological confound. At the same time, non-
factorial control groups may allow for insights about whether it is experienced ease or 
experienced difficulty, or both, that drive the difference between the few versus many 
conditions. The present studies consistently suggest that experienced ease leads to a different 
level of helping compared to the control condition. At least in our studies, easy self-
generation thus creates an advantage, whereas the experience of difficulty does not result in a 
disadvantage compared to the control group.  
 The present studies extend prior self-persuasion findings from the realm of attitudes to 
behavioural intentions. In particular, we show that participants are particularly likely to help a 
stranger after self-generating arguments for why it is good to help felt easy. In contrast to the 
success of easy self-generation, reading any number of arguments resulted in helping 
intentions on the level of the control condition. Together, these findings suggest that easy 
self-generation is a powerful means for guiding behaviour and may thus be of interest to 
researchers in very different areas of psychology and beyond.  
 Strictly speaking, the present experiments measured intent and not behaviour. 
However, the two were intimately linked in our studies, because what kept participants from 
enacting their intentions was the confederate who stopped proceedings after intent was 
measured. Hence, though we measured intent, conclusions about behaviour appear justified. 
This is interesting because despite the enormous amount of research on retrieval or 
generation fluency on frequency or attitudes (see Wänke, 2013; Weingarten & Hutchinson, 
2016), there is a scarcity of evidence that links fluency to intention (e.g., Menon & Raghubir, 
2003) or actual behaviour (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011c; Müller et al., 2010; Stone & 
Fernandez, 2011).  
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 An open question relates to the processes that underlie the current documented effect 
on behavioural intention. One way to conceptualize this process is in terms of attitudes, 
assuming that self-generating reasons for helping leads to the formation of an attitude 
towards helping, which may then translate into behaviour, either in a more deliberate fashion 
via intentions (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), or a more automatic fashion (e.g., Fazio, 1990). 
Because we did not assess attitudes, we cannot formally test this account. However, for the 
same reason, attitudes may not have been very accessible, which is a necessary precursor in 
both models (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989).  
 A second way in which effects on behaviour have been conceptualized is in terms of 
priming (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). From this perspective, both self-generation and 
provision increases the accessibility of arguments, and accessible content guides behavioural 
responses. Note, however, that such a priming perspective would predict more helping when 
many compared to few arguments are accessible, for writers and readers alike. This, however, 
is not what we observed in Study 2. 
 The third way follows the logic of Schwarz‘ (2011) “feelings-as-information” 
account, in that participants are assumed to implicitly ask themselves “Should I provide 
help?” and infer the answer to this question based on their cognitive feelings. In particular, if 
recalling arguments is easy, participants may infer that there are many reasons to help, and 
thus engage in helping; in contrast, if recalling is difficult, participants may come to the 
conclusion that there are overall few reasons to help, and thus not engage in helping. Note 
that mediation via attitudes is not needed for this explanation to hold. This allows for the 
intriguing conclusion that ease-of-retrieval effects on behaviour need not be weaker than 
ease-of-retrieval effects on attitudes. Interestingly, to draw inferences, individuals need to 
hold naive theories about what experienced ease or difficulty means in the respective context 
(e.g., Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). In the tradition of Tversky and Kahneman (1973), the 
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above example employs a naive theory that links fluency with frequency, that is, experiences 
of ease or difficulty with the existence of many versus few cognitions (for a direct test of this 
naive theory, e.g., Winkielman & Schwarz, 2001). Other naive theories link fluency to 
confidence (e.g., Wänke & Bless, 2000) or thought complexity (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 
2006). For instance, when recall feels easy (difficult), individuals may infer that they can 
(cannot) be confident in the recalled content information. Theoretically, each of these naive 
theories, or even multiple ones, may account for the observed pattern of results. Which naïve 
theory is recruited in a specific situation may also depend on contextual variables, such as the 
question being asked.  
Conclusion 
 The present findings highlight the potential of self-generation techniques, especially if 
self-generation is fluent. They thus add to a long and fruitful tradition of research on self-
persuasion (e.g., Greenwald & Albert, 1968; Janis & King, 1954; King & Janis, 1956), and 
demonstrate important implications for all domains in which behavioural change is desired. 
Apparently, what is easily self-produced convinces the most.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The percentage of participants who responded “yes” to a feedback request after 
generating two, ten, or no arguments why it is good to help (Study 1). 
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Figure 2. The percentage of participants who responded “yes” to a feedback request after 
generating two or ten arguments, reading two or ten arguments, or not generating or reading 
arguments why it is good to help (Study 2). 
